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This article elaborates on the tax policy responses in the area of direct taxation that are currently on the table at both the OECD and EU levels.
The digital economy cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of the economy; it is the overall economy that is becoming increasingly digitalized. As
any ring-fencing of the digital parts of the economy would seem infeasible, the fact that all the tax reform initiatives contemplated seem to be
pursuing that exact objective is rather anomalous. Such a move would seem to bring little to the table other than market distortions, inequities,
arbitrary taxation, tax cascading, legal uncertainties, and red tape. When it comes to fixing the broken international tax framework, there seems to
be no such thing as a readily available ‘quick fix’. So the real question on the table would seem to be whether we should instead consider breaking
away from status quos in company taxation and proceeding to explore genuine and fundamental corporate tax reform.
1 INTRODUCTION
On Friday 16 February 2018, the Instituto de Direito
Económico, Financeiro e Fiscal (IDEFF) of the
University of Lisbon’s Law School, together with
Intertax and the University of Lausanne, organized a
conference at the Complexo Interdisciplinar in Lisbon,
Portugal, on Taxation and the Digital Economy,1 a subject
that is both very interesting and that has become a
topical and politically relevant issue in recent years.2 I
had the honour to participate in the conference and to
elaborate on the tax policy responses in the area of
direct taxation that are currently on the table at both
OECD and EU levels. This conference paper is the
result of my endeavours.
Notes
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1 See https://www.cideeff.pt/ (accessed 1 Mar. 2018).
2 A considerable body of literature has been produced on the topic, particularly in recent years; here a non-exhaustive overview: M. P. Devereux & J. Vella, Response to the EU
Commission’s Consultation – Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 3 Jan. 2018); M. P. Devereux & J. Vella, Implications of
Digitalization for International Corporate Tax Reform (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation WP 17/07 July 2017); S. de Jong, W. Neuvel & Á. Uceda, Dealing with
Data in a Digital Economy, 25(2) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. (2018); G. W. Kofler, G. Mayr & C. Schlager, Taxation of the Digital Economy: A Pragmatic Approach to Short-Term
Measures, 58(4) Eur. Tax’n (2018); A. Mehta, ‘Equalization Levy’ Proposal in Indian Finance Bill 2016: Is It Legitimate Tax Policy or an Attempt of Treaty Dodging?, 22(2) Asia-
Pac. Tax Bull. (2016); K. Andersson, Taxation of the Digital Economy 45(10) Intertax 590–592 (2017); J. Á. G. Requena & S. M. González, Adapting the Concept of Permanent
Establishment to the Context of Digital Commerce: From Fixity to Significant Digital Economic Presence, 45(11) Intertax 732–741 (2017); Y. Brauner & P. Pistone, Adapting Current
International Taxation to New Business Models: Two Proposals for the European Union, 71(12) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2017), G. W. Kofler, G. Mayr & C. Schlager, Taxation of the
Digital Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, 57(12) Eur. Tax’n (2017); M. Olbert & C. Spengel, International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge Accepted?, 9(1)
World Tax J. (2017); U. Schreiber & L. M. Fell, International Profit Allocation, Intangibles and Sales-Based Transactional Profit Split, 9(1) World Tax J. (2017); M. K. Singh,
Taxation of Digital Economy: An Indian Perspective, 45(6/7) Intertax 467–481 (2017); M. Agrawal, India at the Forefront in Implementing BEPS-Related Measures: Equalization Levy
in Line with Action 1, 23(4) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. (2016); W. J. G. Paardekooper, M. van de Ven, A. van Esdonk & Y. C. Cattel, Tax Considerations for the European Union’s
Digital Single Market Strategy, 44(6/7) Intertax 513–524 (2016); C. H.J.I. Panayi, International Tax Law Following the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 70(11)
Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2016); O. Popa, Taxation of the Digital Economy in Selected Countries – Early Echoes of BEPS and EU Initiatives, 55(1) Eur. Tax’n (2016); S. Wagh, The Taxation
of Digital Transactions in India: The New Equalization Levy, 70(9) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2016); D. W. Blum, Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?, 69(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2015); Y. Brauner & A. Baez, Withholding Taxes in the Service of
BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, IBFD White Paper (2 Feb. 2015); L. Cerioni, The New ‘Google Tax’: The ‘Beginning of the End’ for Tax Residence
as a Connecting Factor for Tax Jurisdiction?, 55(5) Eur. Tax’n (2015); J. Pellefigue, Transfer Pricing Economics for the Digital Economy, 22(2) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. (2015); M.
Stewart, Abuse and Economic Substance in a Digital BEPS World, 69(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2015); M. de Wilde, Tax Jurisdiction in a Digitalizing Economy; Why ‘Online Profits’ are
so Hard to Pin Down, 43(12) Intertax 796–803 (2015); A. Bal, The Sky’s the Limit – Cloud-Based Services in an International Perspective, 68(9) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2014); T. Falcão
& B. Michel, Assessing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy: An Eye-Opening Case Study, 42(5) Intertax 317–324 (2014); N. Gaoua, Taxation of the Digital Economy: French
Reflections, 54(1) Eur. Tax’n (2014); P. Gupta, ‘Cloud’ – A Technological Odyssey, 20(5) Asia-Pac. Tax Bull. (2014); W. Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax in the Digital Economy:
Permanent and Other Establishments, 68(6/7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2014); M. K. Singh, Taxing E-Commerce on the Basis of Permanent Establishment: Critical Evaluation, 42(5) Intertax
325–333, 325 (2014); L. Quaratino, New Provisions Regarding the Taxation of the Digital Economy, 54(5) Eur. Tax’n (2014); B. Westberg, Taxation of the Digital Economy – An
EU Perspective, 54(12) Eur. Tax’n (2014); A. Bal, Tax Implications of Cloud Computing – How Real Taxes Fit into Virtual Clouds, 66 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 335 (2012); D. Pinto, The
Need to Reconceptualize the Permanent Establishment Threshold, 60(7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n (2006); R. M. Bird, Taxing Electronic Commerce: The End of the Beginning?, 59(4) Bull. Int’l
Tax’n (2005); A. J. Cockfield, The Law and Economics of Digital Taxation: Challenges to Traditional Tax Laws and Principles, 56(12) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 606–619 (2002), C. E.
McLure, Implementing State Corporate Income Taxes in the Digital Age, 53(4) Nat’l Tax J. (2000); W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 425 (1996/
1997); and R. S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1996/1997).
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Taxation issues arising as a result of our increasingly
digitalizing economy have rapidly moved up the political
agendas in recent years. Their ascent includes being part
of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative of
the G20/OECD (Action 1),3 the outcomes of which – the
BEPS Package – were published on 5 October 2015.4 The
BEPS Package included the final report on Action 1, in
which it was stated that the digital parts of the economy
cannot be segregated – or, in other words, ring-
fenced – from the rest of the economy, either technically
or conceptually.5 The report also stated that solutions for
the tax challenges raised by digitalization should be
sought within the existing tax framework, at least for
the short to medium term. Since then, discussions on
the most appropriate way to tax ‘virtual profits’ have
continued to rage, and these discussions prompted the
G20 Finance Ministers in April and July 2017 to request
the OECD’s BEPS 1 Task Force on Digital Economy
(TFDE) to commence preparations, once more, on a dis-
cussion draft on the matter.6 The OECD subsequently
held a public consultation event on 1 November 2017 at
the University of California, Berkeley, United States, with
the interim report expected to be published ahead of the
G20 meeting in April 2018.
Within the EU, Estonia placed the matter high on
the political agenda in summer 2017 during its pre-
sidency of the Council of the European Union.7 Mid-
September 2017 saw a French-led initiative, comprising
France, Germany, Italy and Spain and supported by six
other EU Member States (Austria, Greece, Portugal,
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia), that requested the
European Commission to examine opportunities for
tax reform in this area in the form of an ‘equalisation
tax’, i.e. some sort of turnover tax that would subject
tech firms to tax on the gross proceeds from their
digital supplies in the EU.8 This initiative was
discussed at the informal ECOFIN in Tallinn, Estonia
on 16 September 2017.9 On 21 September 2017, the
European Commission released a communication
entitled ‘A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the
European Union for the Digital Single Market’, in
which it set out a reform agenda with a view to devis-
ing tax measures for the digital economy.10 This was
followed on 26 October 2017 by the European
Commission’s launching of a public consultation.11
Suggestions put forward in the Commission’s consulta-
tion include options for both short-term and long-term
measures, all seeking to move beyond the outcomes of
the G20/OECD BEPS Project. Measures suggested in
the consultation range from the introduction of specific
turnover-based taxes for the tech sector to modifications
to the permanent establishment rules, transfer pricing
rules and rules on attributing permanent establish-
ments’ profits. The reform options put forward in the
consultation even go as far as suggesting a generic
overhaul of the current corporate tax framework, as
well as proposals for modifying the pending proposals
for a C(C)CTB or even introducing a worldwide unitary
taxation model apportioning tax base to sales
jurisdictions.
On 5 December 2017 the ECOFIN Council reached
conclusions with a view to outlining a common EU
approach in discussions at an international level.12
Urging the OECD to come forward with solutions for
tax treaties, transfer pricing and attributing permanent
establishments’ profits, the Council also invited the
European Commission to forward appropriate reform pro-
posals by early 2018. These are expected to be launched
shortly, i.e. before the ECOFIN meeting on 23 March
2018, ahead of the OECD’s expected TFDE interim
report, and are likely to include a proposal for an EU-
wide equalization tax, at least for the short term. Indeed, a
Notes
3 OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing 2013). In this regard reference should also be made to P.
Collin & N. Colin, Task Force on Taxation of the Digital Economy, Report to the Minister for the Economy and Finance, the Minister for Industrial Recovery, the Minister
Delegate for the Budget and the Minister Delegate for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Innovation and the Digital Economy (Jan. 2013) and European Commission,
Report of the Commission Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy (28 May 2014).
4 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report (OECD Publishing 2015). The OECD already performed work on the challenges
raised by digitalization around the turn of the millennium; see OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Clarification on the Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-
Commerce: Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on Article 5 (OECD 22 Dec. 2000).
5 OECD, supra n. 4, at 12. The OECD already stated in its ‘September 2014 deliverable’ that the digital economy could not be treated separately from the rest of the economy.
See OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 12 (OECD Publishing 2014).
6 OECD, OECD Secretary-General Report to G20 Leaders (OECD Publishing July 2017), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-leaders-july-2017.
pdf (accessed 1 Mar. 2018).
7 Council of the European Union, Note from Presidency to High Level Working Party on Tax Issues, BEPS: Presidency Roadmap on Future Work, 10998/17, FISC 157 (7 July
2017).
8 Ministers of Finance of France, Germany, Italy and Spain, Political statement, Joint Initiative on the Taxation of Companies Operating in the Digital Economy, September 2017,
http://www.mef.gov.it/opencms754/opencms/inevidenza/banner/170907_joint_initiative_digital_taxation.pdf (accessed 1 Mar. 2018).
9 Presidency Issues Note for the informal ECOFIN Tallinn, Discussion on corporate taxation challenges of the digital economy (16 Sept. 2017).
10 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Fair and Efficient Tax System in the European Union for the
Digital Single Market, COM(2017) 547 final (21 Sept. 2017).
11 European Commission, Consultation, Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy (26 Oct. 2017–3 Jan. 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/consultations/fair-taxation-digital-economy_
en (accessed 1 Mar. 2018).
12 Council of the European Union, ‘A’ Item Note from General Secretariat of the Council to Council, Council Conclusions on ‘Responding to the Challenges of Taxation of Profits of the
Digital Economy’, 15175/17, FISC 320, ECOFIN 1064 (30 Nov. 2017).
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Commission services document to this end was already
circulating in late February 2018.13
Just listing the recent developments in the area reveals
the great sense of political urgency. The matter needs to be
addressed, and fast. The question, then, is how? This
article, drawing from and building on some of my earlier
articles14 and co-authored writings,15 delves into the opera-
tion of the international tax framework as it currently
stands, with the purpose of identifying what exactly the
issue is that the digitalization of our economies has revealed
(section 2). The article firstly seeks to discover some under-
lying policy rationale when it comes to taxing corporate
profit in a multi-jurisdictional environment, with a key
question in this regard being how to geographically divide
company profits between jurisdictions from a tax policy
perspective (section 3). The article then assesses how the
matter is being addressed (in policy terms, that is) under
the reform options currently on the table (section 4). The
subsequent comparative assessment of the reform options
creates some room for manoeuvre and allows the author to
express some critical observations and suggestions, with the
aim of contributing to the debate.
2 THE INCREASINGLY DIGITALIZING
ECONOMY IS EXPOSING A FAILING
INTERNATIONAL TAX FRAMEWORK
The real problem in company taxation is that today’s
international corporate tax systems have long become
outdated, and updates to the international tax framework
in its current form have not kept pace with the evolution
of present-day business models and practices.16
Contemporary corporate tax systems date back to the
1920s – the early days of international taxation.
Basically, all the updates and modifications that have
been made to the system since – including those under
the umbrella of the BEPS initiative and its transposition,
for instance, in the EU – have been made with the aim of
addressing and countering undue behaviour of taxpayers
(aggressive tax planning) and countries (harmful tax com-
petition). The basics of the international tax regime, the
building blocks of company taxation, have thus been left
intact for over a century. A disconnect has consequently
arisen between taxation on the one hand and market
realities on the other. This gap is widening and is being
fuelled by an ongoing and ever-increasing internationali-
zation and digitalization of businesses and markets that
have left company taxation regimes struggling to achieve
their public financing and redistribution functions, and
consequently struggling to maintain their legitimacy.17
The corporate tax systems inherited from the past are
based on the concept of locally organized businesses oper-
ating in close proximity to their customers and with a
strong physical presence in the country.18 Back in the old
days, when international business revolved primarily
around bulk trade and bricks-and-mortar industries, it
certainly made sense to levy tax on a company’s profit in
such a way. Today’s markets, however, increasingly oper-
ate in a different reality. Driven by profit-optimization
objectives, multinational enterprises now structure their
businesses on a regional or even global basis, mostly
commercializing intangible resources, and fragmenting
production (capital and labour) and sales (goods and ser-
vices) locations across the world. And it is the internet
above all that has enabled businesses to sell their tangible
and intangible products remotely, thus allowing them to
service markets without the need to establish a local
physical or legal presence in the country.19 Unlike in
the past, there is now no longer any need for production
and consumption to occur within the same jurisdictions.
The internet has expanded business opportunities in terms
Notes
13 Commission services, Taxation of Digital Activities in the Single Market (26 Feb. 2018). As forwarded in European Commission, supra n. 10, the document outlines that
the pursued strategy includes a short-term solution (turnover levy on certain digital supplies at a rate in the region of 1% to 5%; the tax would be levied by reference to a
one-stop-shop model similar to that in EU VAT and the CCCTB proposal), and a long-term solution (modification to permanent establishment thresholds and profit
attribution rules). The Commission services document mentions that the turnover tax is not envisaged to target the entire tech sector but would focus on those tech firms
that operate business models where user participation is a key source of value creation. The tax would only apply to companies with annual global sales exceeding EUR 750
million of which at least EUR 10 (or 50) million are made in the EU. Targeted digital supplies include the provision of online advertisement space, user data, or a digital
platform/marketplace. Digital content supplies (streaming video or music content, cloud computing, online gaming, IT solutions) would fall outside the confines of the
envisaged turnover levy. The tax liability would be geographically localized by reference to advertisement display, user data supply, platform access (‘where the eyeballs are’).
The document gives as an example two US firms where one (Coca Cola) buys advertising space from another (Facebook) to target EU users; that would lead to tax liability of
the latter mentioned even in the absence of any other local economic presence.
14 De Wilde, supra n. 2, at 796–803; M. F. de Wilde, Sharing the Pie; Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market (IBFD 2017); M. F. de Wilde, The CCCTB Relaunch: A Critical
Assessment and Some Suggestions for Modification, Group for Research on European and International Taxation (GREIT), 11th GREIT Congress, European Tax Integration: Law,
Policy and Politics, Ischia, Italy, 8–10 Sept. 2016, Conference Proceeding (in press).
15 The Dutch Association of Tax Advisers (de Nederlandse Orde van Belastingadviseurs; NOB), NOB Commentary Digital Economy Consultation, European Commission Public
Consultation on ‘Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy’ (26 Oc. 2017–3 Jan. 2018); M. F. de Wilde & J. B. Schober, Consultation Regarding the Fair Taxation of the Digital
Economy, European Commission Public Consultation on ‘Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy’ (26 Oct. 2017–3 Jan. 2018); and M. F. de Wilde, J. B. Schober, P. Klethi, &
R. van der Wilt, Tax Challenges of the Digitalised Economy, OECD public consultation meeting on the tax challenges of digitalization (University of California 1 Nov. 2017).
16 Falcão & Michel, supra n. 2, at 317–324.
17 R. S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000); R. S. Avi-Yonah & H. Xu, Evaluating BEPS, 2017(1)
Erasmus L. Rev. 3–11 (2017), and see for a comparison also I. J. J. Burgers & I. J. Mosquera Valderrama, Corporate Taxation and BEPS: A Fair Slice for Developing Countries?, 1
Erasmus L. Rev. 29–47 (2017).
18 De Wilde, Sharing the Pie; Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market, supra n. 14, at Ch. 1.
19 De Wilde, supra n. 2, at s. 1 and The Dutch Association of Tax Advisers, supra n. 15, at s. 1.1.
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of size and magnitude in a way never seen before. There is
virtually no limitation in the ability to upscale digital
business models, or, as referred to in the Commission
services document, we now have ‘scale without mass’.20
Corporate taxation, however, has not kept pace with these
changes, and the shortcomings seem particularly evident in
the case of profits generated by internet-related business
activities.21 The concept of the permanent establishment in
company taxes requires a permanent physical presence in a
country, while this is obviously not that relevant for a
webstore. The ‘backstop’ of residency for corporate tax pur-
poses – i.e. the place of incorporation and the place of
effective management – now seems to have become as geo-
graphically mobile as the relevant country’s company laws
governing the company concerned and the effective manager
(s) of the company or group of affiliated companies operating
the internet business. When company profits become
increasingly intangible and virtual, effective taxation of
business proceeds becomes particularly difficult in a tax
framework where the jurisdiction to tax is established on
the basis of legal, physical and geographical points of refer-
ences. In other words, where the points of reference for
subjecting profits to tax are all based on the idea that an
enterprise needs to be legally and physically present in a
market in order to earn money there, an idea reflecting the
bricks-and-mortar market realities of the past.
This holds true both for digital and for more traditional
companies, despite the emphasis being put on the tech sector
in the current political and public debates. It is the overall
economy that is increasingly becoming digital. Ultimately,
no analytical difference exists between tech and non-tech.
Tech firms also use tangible value drivers in their business
operations, while non-tech firms also make use of intangible
and virtual value drivers. Long before everyone went online,
we already had distance sales operations (mail order compa-
nies), agents and broker companies, and advertisement-sell-
ing (advertising brochures) and marketing data collection
operations (loyalty programmes, for instance). Such business
operations had been commonplace for decades before the
internet and the online retail businesses, online intermedia-
tion services platforms, online marketing data-selling and
online advertisement-selling businesses emerged as a corol-
lary. The OECD was right to observe in its final report on
BEPS 1 in October 2015 that digital and non-digital cannot
be isolated from one another.22
In fact, the problems in the international tax framework
seem to have been there more or less from the start.23 There
were already difficulties in the past when seeking, for instance,
to tax distance sellers in the market jurisdiction. What the
internet has done represents merely a change in terms of size
and magnitude – a gradual rather than an analytical matter,
that is – and, with that, a change in terms of the economic
relevance of the faults in the tax system. The challenges facing
company taxation do not ultimately seem to be the result of
the digitalizing economy. Instead, it seems the other way
around. The tax challenges raised by digitalization seem to
be the result of an ill-equipped international tax framework
and the arbitrary taxation that these faults have produced in
consequence. And that is exactly what the internationalization
and digitalization of the economy seem to be exposing: a
failing international company taxation model. And as the
digital part of the economy becomes increasingly relevant in
terms of its size, magnitude and economic dominance, the
more pressing the problems in international taxation are
becoming.
3 GEOGRAPHICAL TAX BASE DIVISION; SOME
WORDS ON TAX POLICY
The geographical separation between supply and demand
that economic globalization and digitalization have
enabled – perhaps even encouraged – now seems to be
forcing us to come clean and to decide which side we are
on when it comes to assigning tax base to countries.24
With regard to taxing business proceeds in a multi-jur-
isdictional environment, there is a broad understanding,
both internationally and at an EU level, that business
income tax systems should be designed to operate equi-
tably and efficiently and should seek to tax business
investment returns once at a geographical location of
value creation: in other words, single taxation at a location
that makes some economic sense.25 Both the G20/OECD’s
BEPS initiative and the European Commission have
resorted to these notions of taxing business profit at the
locations of entrepreneurial presence.26 The difficult and
Notes
20 Commission services, supra n. 13, at s. 1.
21 See also E. E. López, An Opportunistic, and Yet Appropriate, Revision of the Source Threshold for the Twenty-First Century Tax Treaties, 43(6) Intertax 6–13 (2015).
22 OECD, supra n. 4, at 12.
23 De Wilde, supra n. 2, at s. 2.1.
24 P. B. Musgrave, Principles for Dividing the State Corporate Tax Base, in The State Corporation Income Tax: Issues in Worldwide Unitary Combination 228 et seq. (C. E. McLure, Jr.
ed., Hoover Institution Press Publication 1984). For a comparison, see E. C. C. M. Kemmeren, Source of Income in Globalizing Economies: Overview of the Issues and a Plea for an
Origin-Based Approach, 60 Bull. Int’l Tax’n 430 (2006).
25 For in-depth assessments and literature references supporting the analysis in this section, see De Wilde, Sharing the Pie; Taxing Multinationals in a Global Market, supra n. 14,
at Ch. 6.
26 Communiqué of the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Moscow of 19–20 July 2013, at para. 18: Profits should be taxed where functions
driving the profits are performed and where value is created’. See for a comparison also European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council, A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action, COM(2015) 302 final (SWD(2015) 121 final), (17 June
2015), at 9: ‘A fully-fledged CCCTB would make a major difference in reinforcing the link between taxation and where profits are generated.’
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yet to be answered question is then how to determine
where that location of value creation is geographically
situated. The lack of any international consensus on this
fundamental matter of policy lies at the heart of the
current digital-economy-and-taxation issue.
The international tax regime in its current form is
dominated by the transfer pricing model, which focuses
on dividing tax base among production locations.27 The
tax model is basically geared towards assigning tax jur-
isdiction and tax base to those jurisdictions where the
relevant people functions and assets (capital and risks)
are deployed. In practice, and particularly since the
embracing of the BEPS outcomes concerning Action
items 8–10,28 the geographical locations of functions
performed are essential in this regard since the geographi-
cal attribution of assets aligns with the locations where
these assets are effectively managed and functionally uti-
lized in the respective firms’ business processes. This
means, ultimately, that taxable profit is, or at least should
be, allocated for company tax purposes to those places in
which the people relevant to the enterprise perform the
activities relevant to the enterprise, and thus to the supply
side (labour) and the country of origin.29 The same basi-
cally holds true when it comes to establishing the tax
jurisdiction, given that there, too, the primary focus is on
business inputs: the place of effective management
(labour), the physical permanent establishment (a physical
presence: capital and tangible assets), the services perma-
nent establishment (labour) and the dependent agency
permanent establishment (performance of representative
functions: labour).30 All these places relate to the supply
side of income production, with the demand side of
income – the location of the market, that is – playing
no role in this regard.31 The transfer pricing model ulti-
mately seeks to apportion tax base by reference to a fair
market value for each unit of the various functions
performed.
The lingering public discussion on devising tax reform
options for the tech sector seems to be focusing on the
question of whether the tech firms involved and the
business models they deploy create scope for assigning
tax base, under the operation of the current tax model,
to the jurisdiction in which the customer or content user
resides (referred to in the Commission services document
as ‘user value creation’).32 The basic argument for an
affirmative position in this respect would be that these
tech firms make a profit from advertising, basically by
extracting valuable marketing data from their content
user bases in return, for instance, for a discount on the
sale made, or the online service provided. Or in return for
free-of-charge use of the online content provided in the
form of, say, a freely available social media platform or
streaming content. The accordingly mined and processed
marketing data is subsequently sold to the market. This
begs the question as to whether the transfer pricing model
is sufficiently equipped – analytically, that is – to assign
any tax base to any such user or customer jurisdictions.
In my view, no convincing argument exists for basing
attribution of the tax base under the current transfer
pricing model to user and customer locations, regardless
of the business model employed by the firm involved, and
regardless of whether the business is a tech or non-tech
enterprise.33 Online content users and customers are third
parties vis-à-vis the supplying tech firms involved. These
users cannot and should not be considered to perform any
functions for these firms. Data mining by tech firms in
return, for instance, for content usage that is free (or at a
discounted rate) for customers is ultimately merely a
(reciprocal) payment for a (reciprocal) supply of services
in kind in a third-party transaction. Assuming that the
raw data mined from content usage have economic value,
it is not the tech firm that owns these data. Rather, it is
the content users who own, and surrender – or supply for
that matter – such data in return for the right to use
content. In other words, tech firms pay to obtain such
data by supplying free content, while content users – per-
haps unwittingly – pay for the ‘free’ use of the content by
surrendering personal or other information on their beha-
viour patterns, habits, customer-decision processes, views,
and preferences. Utilizing information technology
resources (e.g. ‘cookie files’) and algorithms, the raw
data mined by the tech firm are subsequently aggregated,
processed and transformed into market knowledge or
marketing intangibles. These intangible assets are subse-
quently commercialized and exploited as a marketable
product to be sold in the marketplace to the online
advertisement selling tech firm’s actual customers (we
notably seem to also be making the mistake here that
we are looking at online platform users rather than the
tech firm’s actual customers). Ultimately, there is not
Notes
27 Kemmeren, supra n. 24.
28 OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8–10 – 2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing
2015).
29 Kemmeren, supra n. 24.
30 De Wilde, supra n. 2, at s. 2.3.
31 The Dutch Association of Tax Advisers, supra n. 15, at s. 1.3.
32 Commission Services, supra n. 13, at s. 1. For analyses on the transfer pricing aspects involving digitalization see De Jong et al., supra n. 2; Pellefigue, supra n. 2; Olbert &
Spengel, supra n. 2; and Schreiber & Fell, supra n. 2.
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much difference between an old-fashioned loyalty pro-
gramme, an intermediation service or advertisement sale,
or a mail order company’s remote sale. The only thing the
internet has changed in this respect is size and scale; i.e.
mass. This simultaneously explains why it is inappropriate
to separate tech from non-tech for the purposes of devising
tax rules. Under the international tax regime, remote
sales, including those performed by an online content
provider or an e-tailer, simply do not create a taxable
presence in the market jurisdiction. And even if some
taxable presence were to be constructed in this regard by
means, for instance, of a modification of the permanent
establishment threshold, the transfer pricing model sub-
sequently provides no basis to assign any tax base to that
market jurisdiction, given the lack of functions performed
in that jurisdiction by the respective firm, tech or other-
wise. This is because these functions are performed else-
where: in the production jurisdiction, for instance, where
the mined data are transformed into marketing intangi-
bles and, therefore, a marketable product.
Given that the transfer pricing model provides no room
for taxing the tech industry – or any branch of economic
activity, for that matter – in the market jurisdiction,
analytical connections for pursuing such an objective per-
haps need to be found elsewhere in the international tax
regime. A link for establishing a tax base division by
reference to market jurisdictions may be recognized in
the withholding tax model.34 Albeit not explained in
those terms, there are withholding taxes or source taxes
in the international tax arena that assign tax jurisdiction
to destination countries, i.e. to the demand side of income
production. Resorting to ‘income arising in’ terminology in
the tax treaties, such source taxes consistently refer, when
establishing the service provider’s tax jurisdiction, to the
location where the recipient of the service is located, or at
least has its place of residence or operates business activ-
ities through a permanent establishment. In other words,
the tax base is allocated to market jurisdictions. The
production jurisdiction is accordingly irrelevant in the
withholding tax model in terms of establishing where
the service provider geographically derives its income
from for tax purposes. The withholding tax model directs
tax base (on a gross basis) to market locations, while the
transfer pricing model directs tax base (on a net basis) to
production locations.35 To that extent, the withholding
tax model and the transfer pricing model accordingly
operate in a mutually exclusive manner, at least from a
perspective of geographical tax base division. This is
particularly interesting, considering that both models
resort to a notion of ‘source’ as a justification for their
existence in the international tax framework. A note-
worthy point in this regard is that any levying of source
taxes on a gross rather than net basis makes the imposi-
tion of withholding taxes on outbound payments for
inbound supplies operate in a way conceptually and eco-
nomically akin to the internationally well-known destina-
tion-based turnover taxes, excises taxes, and sales taxes in
a cumulative cascade system, albeit with an ordinary tax
credit in the origin jurisdiction.
Should society have any desire to extend tax base attri-
bution to market jurisdictions, the question then to be
examined should be whether we ought to start thinking of
fundamentally reforming the international tax regime. In
that event, I think we should. The law cannot be consid-
ered in splendid isolation or as an end in itself. The law,
and the tax law it includes, is embedded in an economic
and socio-political context that shapes it, and hence
should cater to needs and developments in society. The
question then is whether we should move away from the
dominant transfer pricing model? Should we move to
broaden the withholding tax model in one way or
another? And, if so, should we impose tax on a gross or
a net basis? So far, we have not really engaged in such a
fundamental discussion, at least not in the political arena.
This does not mean, however, that there is no merit in
assigning taxable profits to (or also to) the market juris-
diction. On the contrary, I would think. Both production
(origin) and market (destination) jurisdictions may be
considered to constitute geographical sources of income
since profit is the result of both supply and demand. There
is no profit without supply. But, equally well, there is no
profit without demand. The problem then, however, is to
determine how much of a multinational firm’s profit to
assign to these production jurisdictions and market jur-
isdictions, and in what ratio? 30% demand, 70% supply?
Or maybe the other way round? Or 50/50? As income
lacks geographical characteristics, there is not much else
to say other than that, in the end, matters are more of a
political rather than an analytical nature.36 With regard
to tax base definition I would nevertheless argue for
taxing on a net basis rather than for taxing turnover (i.e.
on a gross basis). Gross turnover-based taxes can easily
transform profitable pre-tax returns into post-tax losses,
particularly when business is large-scale and low-margin,
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as is often the case with e-tailers, and hence distort an
efficient operation of markets.
Considering, however, that tech cannot be ring-fenced
from non-tech, this also means that any proper reform of
company taxation should address all industries so as to
avoid introducing further inequities and inefficiencies
into countries’ company taxation models. If branches of
economic activity cannot be segregated from one another
in any meaningful way in real life, taxes, too, should not
pursue such an objective by introducing taxes specifically
for the tech sector. I understand the political pressure to
deliver something that is feasible. And, of course, I also
understand that only the halfway-house measures that
have been tabled so far for targeting the tech sector are
viable in the short term. That may be particularly the
case if such measures are presented as an interim solu-
tion – even though interim measures sometimes have a
tendency to stick around. For that reason in particular I
would suggest that if such measures are to be adopted,
they should in any event be accompanied by a sunsetting
provision limiting the horizon of any such taxes.37 I do
see the political viability of introducing turnover-based
equalization taxes for digital activities or services,38
regardless of the arbitrariness that the scoping of such a
‘digital’ supply would produce. In that respect, the suc-
cess rates could very well be relatively higher if such
levies were to fall outside the existing tax treaties’ scope
of application. This would be even more so if such taxes
were to apply only to those giant tech companies with
high global turnover volumes by being paired, for
instance, with a country-by-country-reporting threshold
of EUR 750 million of annual global turnover (‘Tax
them, not me!’).39 And I also see the political viability,
to a certain extent at least, of introducing market-based
threshold criteria in the permanent establishment test,
such as turnover volumes tests or active users volumes
tests and the like.40 Such criteria may be considered
particularly viable within the EU if they were to be
introduced by means of a Council Directive and to be
applied only within the EU and/or in third-country
scenarios where no tax treaty applies.41 In my view,
however, political viability and the chances of any tax
reform operation’s political success should not be con-
fused or interfere with – or trump, for that matter – con-
ceptual soundness and inherent fairness arguments. As
with the law, political viability, too, should not be seen
as an end in itself.
Company tax reform should, in my view, be seen as
something to pursue with consciousness. A politically
viable yet inequitable and inherently distortive tax is not
the answer to the tax challenges raised by digitalization.
The discussion on the table is a fundamental one. Do we
want to reform the international tax framework, beyond
BEPS that is, or do we not? And if so, do we want to
redistribute tax base among countries beyond existing
practices, with the objective of further extending the
apportionment of taxation rights towards market jurisdic-
tions, or do we not? Do we really want to push forward in
the direction of taxing turnover? Or do we consider
company taxes still to revolve around net returns? These
are the fundamental, underlying policy issues that should
be put onto the agenda and examined in open and trans-
parent discussions that include consideration of the redis-
tribution of tax revenues and related budgetary and
macro- and micro-economic effects, however politically
difficult and intractable such discussions may be.42 Only
after consensus has been reached on these policy matters,
preferably on a global basis and only alternatively on a
regional (for instance, within the EU) or even unilateral
basis, should we proceed to an assessment of tax design
aspects and matters of a more technical nature. First, the
policy should be set and then reflected in legislation; it
should not be the other – dangerous – way around. In
summary, the real policy matter does not concern specific
taxes for the tech industry and the technicalities of the
tabled reform options. Instead, it is about something else,
namely whether or not we should pursue true corporate
tax reform.43
4 A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
TABLED REFORM OPTIONS AND SOME
SUGGESTIONS TO ADD TO THE DEBATE
All the reform measures put forward internationally and
at an EU level, both for the short and the longer term,
move beyond the existing international tax framework,
and all of them tend towards assigning the tax base to
market jurisdictions. This applies, as said, despite the
absence of a clear policy consensus on whether we actually
agree on moving from an origin-based model to a tax
Notes
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system more geared to a destination-based conception
(regardless of the analytical merits of such a move). A
closer look at the measures put forward also reveals that
all the measures would be highly problematic from an
analytical point of view, except perhaps for any contem-
plated scenarios of generically overhauling and remodel-
ling the system, and a clean-slate introduction of a sales-
only apportionment or other destination-based company
taxation model.
The new taxes that have been suggested as a short-term
measure specifically seek to target the tech sector or even
specific segments of this sector (such as those segments
whose business models focus on ‘user value creation’44).
This applies in the case of the turnover-based equalization
levies (as suggested by France, India, the OECD and the
European Commission), the gross-based withholding taxes
on digital goods and services (as suggested by the OECD
and the European Commission), the transaction taxes on
revenues from collecting digital data (as suggested by the
European Commission) and also the envisaged digital
advertising taxes (as suggested by Commission services
and Hungary) and digital marketplaces/platforms taxes
(as suggested by Commission services). Quite remarkably,
these ‘digitaxes’ all seek to achieve the impossible, which
is to ring-fence the economy’s digital component or parts
of this from the rest of the economy and to isolate them
for tax purposes. As stated before, any such slicing of the
economy for business income tax purposes is simply ana-
lytically infeasible, in the real world, that is, and hence
also in the world of taxation. Ultimately, it is simply
uncalled for to target or scope any taxes to a specified
group of tech firms or their digital supplies, regardless of
the legal criteria adopted, definitions used and volume
thresholds embraced. The only thing these sales-tax-like
taxes would bring is trouble: multiple taxation, inequi-
ties, market distortions, legal uncertainty, and red tape,
both for tax authorities and taxpayers alike. That applies
regardless of any opportunities contemplated or envisaged
to allow, or not to allow, such taxes to be credited against
corporate taxes (as excess credit positions would inevitably
be created), to allow these to be deducted as a cost from
any corporate tax bases of the targeted firms involved, or
to have such taxes apply equally to both domestic and
cross-border business operations.45 The drawbacks and
limitations of these digitaxes are obvious, irrespective of
the political viability of any of the taxes that have been
suggested. As said, political viability is not an end in
itself. We should not forget that digitalization is an
accelerator for growth.46 The economic merits of digitali-
zation should not just be taxed away and, in consequence,
hamper growth and job creation.
Long-term solutions include suggestions to revise the
permanent establishment threshold in the tax treaties.47
Depending on how such a modification to the permanent
establishment threshold is designed, it could either be
considered a targeted or ring-fenced tax measure, or a
measure of a more generic nature directing tax jurisdic-
tion towards the destination jurisdiction. All the sugges-
tions put forward mirror to some extent VAT-style
approaches towards distance sales and lead to tax jurisdic-
tion being established by reference to a certain amount of
turnover derived from sales in the market jurisdiction (say
EUR [x] million) during a certain period (say [x]
months).48 If the turnover test were not to further specify
the nature of these sales, such a test could be considered to
constitute a generic measure. In that case, it would not
matter whether the sale was of an intangible nature (e.g.
services, digital supplies) or tangible nature (e.g. supplies
of goods). If the threshold test were to specifically include
the nature of activities by referring, for instance, to a
‘turnover from digital supplies test’ or the like, the test
would be transformed into a criterion ring-fencing tech
(or varieties of ‘tech’) from non-tech for tax purposes, and
would hence introduce scoping issues and ensuing arbi-
trariness similar to those described in the previous para-
graph. On top of that, such a test would also give rise to
issues of delineation and concurrent application. The per-
manent establishment threshold has so far been geared
towards establishing jurisdiction for tax purposes in the
origin country, while the envisaged turnover-based mod-
ifications are geared towards establishing tax jurisdiction
in the destination country. Any introduction of such a
modification would immediately create tension between
origin and destination jurisdictions. Which country
would get the first bite of the tax pie? Say we had a case
where a taxpayer resident in country X produced a digital
product in origin country A (functions performed), where
it operated a ‘traditional’ permanent establishment, and
subsequently sold the product involved in destination
country B (products sold), where it operated a ‘new’
permanent establishment under the envisaged threshold
test. Which of the countries would win the tax base
division poker game? Nobody knows, it seems. It should
be noted that no such issues and accompanying tensions
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arise today, either in corporate taxation or in VAT, as
these taxes are so far all exclusively directed either towards
origin jurisdictions or towards destination jurisdictions.
With regard to this sought-after long-term solution, it
is also envisaged amending the manner in which taxable
profit is attributed to any such newly formed permanent
establishments.49 Assuming it were to be possible to
arrive at a more or less workable method of establishing
jurisdiction by reference to such a new type of destination-
oriented definition of permanent establishment, the sub-
sequent attribution of tax base would be very likely to
give rise to a whole new world of intricate issues. Today,
tax base allocation rules disregard customer locations. Any
sticking to old profit attribution rules would leave such
newly formed permanent establishments profitless, given
the lack of functions performed in these market jurisdic-
tions. If any consideration were to be given under some
newly established attribution mechanism – resulting from
revision of the transfer pricing model – that assigns tax
base or part of a tax base to customer locations, the
question would then arise as to what extent such re-
apportioning should apply: 10%, 50%, 30%, 70%? The
Commission services document refers to data collected,
numbers of users, and user-generated content, among
others, as a stepping stone for this purpose.50 The real
issue, however, is how to quantify such items or para-
meters, and this has so far been left completely open. It is
not about discovering parameters, it is about tax base
division. Who gets what, and how much of it? Any
move towards such a re-apportionment would lead to a
dramatic and paradigmatic change in the way tax base is
allocated to countries, and would essentially lead to the
introduction of some indistinct variant of formulary
apportionment. On top of that, if something like this
were to be introduced only in the context of attributing
the profits of permanent establishments (Article 7 of the
relevant tax treaty) and not simultaneously also for allo-
cating the tax base to group companies (Article 9 of the
relevant tax treaty), any such move would introduce dif-
ferentials in the tax treatment of permanent establish-
ments compared with that of group companies and
hence create all kinds of distortions and inequities invol-
ving the choice of legal form and – in cases where EU law
applies – all kinds of EU law impediments. Any
modifications to the division of multi-jurisdictional tax
bases should therefore be addressed with utmost care.
Otherwise, the cure could very well turn out to be even
worse than the disease. To be honest, this is exactly what
seems to be happening here.
Within the EU, these reform options envisaged for the
longer term are paired with considerations of including
them in the negotiations on the currently pending propo-
sal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB51), a solution for the longer term.52 Replacing
the current tax framework within the EU by a formulary
model, through a CCCTB, would constitute a systemic
and generic corporate tax reform for the internal market.
One may ask, however, whether the CCCTB in its current
form should be the way forward, i.e. in the absence of any
political agreement on the adoption of a formulary system
apportioning tax base by reference to an equally weighted,
three-factor (payroll-assets-sales) formula. On previous
occasions I have elaborated on certain vulnerabilities of
the CCCTB system to BEPS strategies across the water’s
edge, and subsequent intra-EU profit shifting via factor
manipulation strategies, due to some faults in the design
of the apportionment formula.53 Rather than revisiting
these vulnerabilities, I will limit myself here to comment-
ing that any modifications to the permanent establish-
ment test in the CCCTB proposal that specifically target
the tech sector would not alter matters in that regard. My
observation would be that any such modification to the
permanent establishment test in the pending CCCTB
proposals would also do little else but introduce the
same delineation and concurrence issues as those discussed
in the paragraphs directly above.
The Commission consultation also refers to the poten-
tial to introduce a worldwide unitary taxation model.54
Such a unitary model as mentioned in the consultation
would operate in a way akin to the CCCTB, unless,
importantly, its application were not to be limited to
the geographical territories of the EU (i.e. no water’s
edge limitation; global formulary apportionment), and
in the event of a sales-only apportionment mechanism
being adopted instead of the equally weighted, three-
factor (payroll-assets-sales) formula as currently proposed.
The desirability of replacing the current international tax
framework by such a unitary model (for instance, within
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the EU) is of course, to a great extent, a political and
societal matter, with the micro-economic, macro-eco-
nomic and budgetary implications all having a role to
play in the debate. This said, however, I am a proponent
of a destination-based company tax model on analytical
grounds.55
With a view to true tax reform, it may well be worth
considering remodelling the current international tax
regime into a unitary tax system based on sales-only
apportionment.56 Without going into detail at this
place, I would add that it would then be worth consider-
ing building the tax base definition on the basis of the
concept of economic profit (infra-marginal business
returns). If well-designed, any move in such a direction
would mean that tax would no longer interfere in finan-
cing and investment location decisions. Simultaneously,
countries would then be entirely free to structure their
national governments and fund their public expenditure
as they choose because of such a tax system’s immobile,
inelastic and hard-to-avoid properties (the reason for this
being that as firms do not control output locations, the
tax base division would be hard to dodge). If such a
destination-based system were to be introduced by coun-
tries unilaterally or in concert on a regional basis, for
instance within the EU, the race to the bottom would
be brought to an end within the inner circle of the
adopting countries as the tax system would then operate
completely neutrally on the supply side. The first country
or region to move in this direction would encourage
others to follow suit as that would serve their interests.
Driven by competitive country responses, this could initi-
ate a transition of the international tax regime into a new,
destination-based company tax paradigm that operates
completely neutrally and non-discriminatorily on the sup-
ply side. The final destination would be an efficient and
inelastic mechanism for taxing infra-marginal multina-
tional business returns. That, in turn, would produce a
result that, as I see it, would not only be fair but also – and
primarily – economically efficient. These efficiency-
enhancing properties of a destination-based company tax
model are known and well-established in literature.57
5 FINAL REMARKS
I now arrive at my final remarks. The digital economy
cannot be seen in isolation from the rest of the economy;
rather, it is the overall economy that is becoming increas-
ingly digitalized. As any ring-fencing of the digital parts
of the economy seems infeasible, the fact that all the tax
reform initiatives currently on the table seem to be pursu-
ing that exact objective seems rather anomalous. This
holds true for the turnover-based equalization levies and
withholding taxes and also for the envisaged modifications
to the permanent establishment threshold for the tech
sector. All the reform options put forward share a require-
ment to separate certain ‘tech taxpayers’ and their ‘tech
transactions’ from ‘non-tech taxpayers’ and their ‘non-tech
transactions’. Such a move would seem to be bringing
little else to the table other than market distortions,
inequities, arbitrary taxation, tax cascading, legal uncer-
tainties, and red tape. When it comes to fixing the broken
international tax framework, there seems to be no such
thing as a readily available ‘quick fix’. Perhaps, therefore,
we should reconsider. And, in that respect, it may be
worth considering breaking away from status quos in
company taxation and instead proceeding to explore gen-
uine and fundamental corporate tax reform. A wide range
of suggestions worth exploring have already been put
forward in literature, with the suggestions submitted
ranging from supply-side oriented global (residual)
profit-splitting systems – echoing transfer pricing
approaches, but without pesky separate accounting and
comparability issues – to supply-side or demand-side
global formulary systems, and extending even to destina-
tion-based cash flow taxes.58 Even the taxation of multi-
nationals solely in the ultimate parent jurisdiction has
been mentioned in literature as a solution.59 All these
proposals merit consideration, while I have arrived at the
idea of taxing groups on their economic profit at
destination.60 We cannot separate digital from non-digi-
tal. Perhaps we should not even be trying to do so. The
real question on the ‘multi-jurisdictional tax base division
poker table’ then is whether to fold or to go all-in?
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